so few comments on top of this… I’ve manage to make a High Level Value Flow chart explaining my proposal here and adding few options around $Allo secondary market making (AMMs), where governance might provide further liquidity, and DAO owned arbitration bots could have Primary AMM (again, the bonding curve) privileges on arbitration against Secondary AMMs. See this as a degen/regen mechanism to try out (bot missing in the flow chart).
While “minting” and “burning” are functions of a bonding curve (aka primary marker making with DAO governed policies) that take inputs [minting] from the 3 economic agents I have identified:
- Funders: aka crypto bros that might be speculation motivation.
- Contributors: aka Allo builders shipping value accounted by p2p sweat capital allocation*.
- DAOs and/or sponsors: aka partners that want to distribute money through $Allo
*Sweat Capital Allocation is a new concept I’m bringing to Allo Capital as per the capabilities of Collabberry.xyz to account for Human capital where:
- Agreements are made: contributors state and agree with the DAO their roles, responsibilities, amount of commitment, and their Market rate for the work they perform.
- Assessments are done: in a p2p way, meaning a contributor assess their co-workers and viceversa, providing feedbacks and pondering people’s performance.
- Aggregation algorithm: for calculating the collective appreciation on each individuals commitments, mint and distribute Sweat tokens to builders (called teamPoints, or TP)
In other words, Collabberry is a P2P Marx Theory of Value experiment, noting that the “commie” meme might be juicy in times of “Make Comunism Great Again” Ethereum CT’s drama.
Allo DAO provides an opportunity to bring this tokenized labour to the Capital Allocation market and bring further incentive to the Value Growth within the ecosystem so we can allocate more value on building allocation protocols. Bringing “Commies” and “Anti-Commies” together.
$Allo tokens are assumed to be used for Capital Allocation Governance, process not included in this scope, a simple example is to limit the use of a Quadratic Funding (with matching pool) where donors (see Gitcoin Rounds example) can donate only with $Allo, and this to be used as a sink mechanism, $Allo 
ing. I’m curious to integrate with other proposals that have deeper thoughts on this.
A Minimun Viable Allo DAO
Well, if you have read my proposal above, you might have realized it’s level of complexity, understanding complexity not only as how difficult it might be to read, but also (and mainly) the amount of externalities not considered that might become very likely for such a system to crash, assuming it can be even developed! (we do know developing capital policies onchain is not that easy, right?). To be honest, I just allow myself to express as maximun my level of tokenomics creativity supported by chatGPT, for me it was fun and inspiring, and I really hope it would be inpiring for you all!
Coming back to the MVP that might even be summoned during EthDenver, my proposal is to deploy a MolochV3 contract where Funders can already start to deposit funds.
On the other side, I’m really kind to experiment with the Sweat Capital concept I’m proposing, meaning that we could work with the agreements (mainly in terms of their market rates and commitment they are giving to Allo DAO design and/or developing) people that are contributing, and also having that ready for EthDenver and launching it as well there. Collabberry’s beta is a beta! meaning that its features are limited (e.g. optimized only for core contributors and not for occasional contributions, still some admin-dependent workarounds could be implemented), but the p2p validation does work nice!
Allo DAO TeamPoints (TP tokens, that might be transferrable or not, depending also on admin sign, again! it’s a beta hehe, decentralization coming soon) might be also a token to be acceptable by the Allo MolochV3 contract for minting (minimun viable token) $ALLO.
About the minimum viable governance, and in order to avoid Token Voting as the main decision voting mechanism (which would avoid of course a 51% attack from a wealthy funder), a shaman should be configured in order to avoid any capital allocation that haven’t pass any proper community deliberation, or to bring (e.g.) the Optimistic Governance with Community Veto model @deltajuliet have proposed (using this as an example as it’s one of the few proposals I’ve been able to read yet).
The purpose of this MV Allo DAO would be (of course) to build the long term Allo DAO of course, with the proper setting of economic research & onchain development teams and squads.