DAO Structure Proposal (Governance, Economics, Incentive Mechanisms, AI)

This proposal focuses on Governance/Tokenomics/CommunityOS structure. There are many elements relevant to Allo Capitals internal processes that Rena’s proposal covers; I did not try to recreate here as I did not have improvement suggestions and believe they synergize well (VC fund, quality control, builder/researcher workflows, etc). This is also one of the reasons I did not check the Intelligence/Research Pillars, although I believe the reward mechanisms in this proposal seamlessly facilitate the intelligence & research work we would want to fund through reputation rewarding and community grants.

Summary:

This proposal zeroes in on the Governance, Tokenomics, and CommunityOS layers. Its core innovations include:

• A bicameral governance framework that pairs the Token Holder Assembly (representing capital interests) with a Contributor or Citizen Council (ensuring expertise and active community participation). This dual structure—enhanced by delegated, quadratic, and time-weighted voting—creates robust checks and balances that prevent plutocracy and promote long-term alignment.

• A sustainable treasury and incentive system. The design leverages diverse revenue streams and integrates innovative tokenomics (like staking/lock-up models) that reward long-term commitment. Notably, the reward mechanisms are set up to facilitate funding for intelligence and research work through reputation rewards and community grants.

• A streamlined CommunityOS that ensures smooth contributor onboarding and decentralized deal flow while reducing bureaucratic overhead. This keeps the DAO agile and capable of rapid, effective decision-making.

It’s important to note that while this proposal deliberately focuses on these areas, many of the internal operational elements—such as the VC fund structure, quality control, and builder/researcher workflows—are already well-addressed in Rena’s draft. I see these as complementary; by not duplicating those areas, this proposal can synergize with Rena’s work rather than conflict with it. In essence, this approach ensures that while strategic governance and incentive structures are robust and innovative, the operational and process-driven components benefit from Rena’s solid groundwork.

Allo takes a 0.5% tithe for capital … why not extract it upon exit (incentive to keep reinvesting) and just exit the investment (rage-quit) if unhappy? Of course, if really want to argue details then participating in governance is given.

Yea, I think these are exactly the kinds of questions and nuances we need to have open debate and discussion around. My proposal is intentionally high-level and structure-based to allow for community discussion around the specific fee percentages and similar details. Wherever we start, these details will likely evolve as we leverage feedback loops and agile responsiveness to gauge the best specific values/parameters. My priority was developing a system that could encourage and reward these types of discussions and active mental engagement.